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ItI THE UTAH COURT ! APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY, : Case No. 950471-CA 
F"la i lit i I il -Apjjel I v.v : 
v s . : 
JAMIE HUNSAKER, : 
: Argument Priority 
I -
 : : - . : Classification Num1 ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an Appeal from a Judgment and conviction for the 
offense * Class E Misdemeanor, violation of Utah 
Code Annotatec , before the Third Judicial Circuit Cour i 
and for Salt Lake County, State Utah, West Valley city 
Department, the Honorable Edward Watson, Judge, presiding, tah 
Code Annotated 78 -21- 3(f) confers jurisdiction upon the Court: of 
Appeals to hear this Appeal. 
ARGUMEN: FKIOKlli CLASSIFICATION 
The above captioned mattei is an appeal from r Judgment of 
conviction and sentence ir » * imin^ l mar-er wherein the i ath 
I I 
provisions t 29(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it 
should be assigned ~*i Argument Priority Classification Number of 
T 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. ' Whether the evidence presented ^r^? herein was 
lega 11 y sufficI ent to demonstrate the g u : efendai che 
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
2. Whether the arresting officer herein had legal authority 
and probable cause to stop and detain the Defendant for the purpose 
of investigating the offense herein charged. 
3. Whether the Court improperly interposed itself into the 
plea bargaining process herein by precluding a negotiated 
disposition of this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant, Jamie Hunsaker, was charged by 
Information in one (1) count before the Third Judicial Circuit 
Court, County of Salt Lake, West Valley City Department, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Edward A. Watson, Judge, presiding, with the 
offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class lfBlf 
Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 (1989). 
On June 7, 1995, Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker was convicted by 
the Court after non-jury trial herein, of the offense charged. 
On July 26, 1995, the Honorable Edward A. Watson sentenced 
Defendant Hunsaker to five (5) days in the Salt Lake County Jail 
and a substantial fine in the premises. 
At trial herein, the Defendant-Appellant argued that: 
A. The evidence presented at trial herein was legally 
insufficient to demonstrate the guilt of Defendant of the offense 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. The arresting officer herein did not have legal 
authority and probable cause to stop and detain the Defendant for 
the purpose of investigating the offense herein charged. 
C. The Court improperly interposed itself into the plea 
2 
bargaining process herein by precluding a negotiated disposition of 
t 
On July 26, 1995, the Honorable Edward A Watson, upon 
petition therefor, issued a Certificate * Probable Cause herein, 
£ 
has occasion to review the within and below matters. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
An interpretation lowing and • I u* "ilted 
Constitutional provisions, Statutes, and Rules " i. determinative of 
the issues herein presented: 
Constitutional Provisions 
Amendment IV, United States Constitution.. 
. • A r t in I II I I I I I i in Il I I ! II in II in f t r l i « i " i n n « I mi I n i t in i n ' • 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44. 
Utah Cc :l E B nnot at n 1 ' 7 
Utah Code Annotated 7 7 -15. 
Rules 
F 
As required by the terms and provision.-, oi Rule 24(1 ) (b) and 
Rul* Rules A p p e l l a t e Procedu*^ I IIH w i t h i n 
C Il i mi mi mi in 
reproduced r incorporated intr trie Addendum hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant, Jamie Hunsakei : , i /as charged LJJ 
Information in c >i u • (J ) Count before the Third Judicial Circuit 
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Court, County of Salt Lake, West Valley City Department, State of 
Utah, Honorable Edward A. Watson, Judge, presiding, with the 
offense of D.U.I., a Class "B" misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated 41-6-44 (1994). (R.l, Tr.4). 
On June 7, 1995, Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker was convicted by 
the Court after non-jury trial herein, of the offense charged. 
Prior to trial herein, and specifically on January 27, 1995, 
April 19, 1995 and June 7, 1995, the City of West Valley and 
counsel for Defendant repeatedly petitioned and moved the Trial 
Court herein to permit amendment of the charges against Defendant-
Appellant to permit summary disposition of this case by plea 
arrangement. Those efforts on the part of counsel were repeatedly 
and steadfastly rebuffed by the Trial Court, and the matter 
thereupon proceeded to trial (Tr. 5-8, 4-19-95) (Tr. 5-8, 6-7-95). 
At trial herein, the City of West Valley elicited evidence 
from the arresting officer, one Travis Pearce, that he had been 
approached by "bouncers" at the parking lot of a well-known West 
Valley drinking establishment and asked to detain a group of people 
getting into a Ford Bronco who reportedly had been involved in an 
altercation inside that establishment. Upon receiving such 
information, Officer Pearce stopped the vehicle and detained the 
driver, Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker. Officer Pearce testified 
that he stopped the vehicle specifically at the request of the 
"bouncers," having himself observed no inappropriate conduct or 
violations of law (Tr. 11-15, Tr. 17-22) 
At this juncture, West Valley City Police Officer Corey 
4 
Newbold arrived upon the scene to assist Officer Pearce. Officer 
Newbold testified that, upon detecting the odor of alcohol on 
Defendant-Appellant's person, he administered two "field tests" to 
Defendant-Appellant, the results of which, in his judgment, 
demonstrated that the Defendant-Appellant was impaired. (Tr. 24-
40, Tr. 68-77). 
# Officer Newbold further testified that he administered a 
chemical test to Defendant-Appellant, specifically a Breathalyzer 
Test. The results of that test were properly excluded from 
evidence by the Trial Court. (Tr. 48-67). 
Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker testified that he had consumed 
only a small amount of alcohol on the evening in question, that he 
was in no wise impaired and that the "field tests" relied upon by 
the City herein were administered under the most adverse of 
conditions. (Tr. 90-123). 
Mr. Hunsaker1s wife, April Hunsaker, testified that she picked 
up her husband at the West Valley City Police Department shortly 
after his arrest herein, that he appeared to be "normal" at such 
time and that he evidenced no unusual conduct or impairment when 
she saw him. (Tr. 124-135). 
At trial herein, and at the subsequent sentencing proceedings 
had on July 26, 1995, the Defendant-Appellant argued: 
A. The evidence presented at trial herein was legally 
insufficient to demonstrate the guilt of Defendant of the offense 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. The arresting officer herein did not have legal 
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authority and probable cause to stop and detain the Defendant for 
the purpose of investigating the offense herein charged. 
C. The Court improperly interposed itself into the plea 
bargaining process herein by precluding a negotiated disposition of 
this matter. 
The above arguments notwithstanding, on June 7, 1995, 
Defendant-Appellant was adjudged Guilty herein, and on July 26, 
1995, he was sentenced to five (5) days in the Salt Lake County 
Jail and to a substantial fine in the premises. 
On July 26, 1995, the Honorable Edward A. Watson, upon 
petition therefor, issued a Certificate of Probable Cause herein, 
staying execution of the within sentence until this Honorable Court 
could review this matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in concluding that the evidence 
presented herein was sufficient to demonstrate the guilt of 
Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the Trial Court 
erred in concluding that the arresting officer herein had legal 
authority to stop, detain and arrest Defendant. Finally, the Trial 
Court erred in improperly insinuating and interposing itself into 
the plea bargaining process herein. This Court should reverse the 
verdict and judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter with 
directions that the Trial Court enter a verdict of acquittal 
herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
6 
THE EVIDENCE HEREIN PRESENTED WAS LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THE GUILT OF 
DEFENDANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
It is well established as a matter of law that the evidence 
presented upon trial in a criminal case must be sufficient to 
demonstrate the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 
State v. John. 586 P.2d 410 (Utah S. Ct. , 1978); State v. Granato. 
610 P.2d 1290 (Utah S. Ct., 1980). 
An appellate Court, in reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, on the above standard, to demonstrate the guilt of the 
accused, must determine whether the verdict is supported by 
substantial evidence and whether a rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or whether the evidence was so insubstantial or 
inconclusive that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the crime charged. State 
v. Dver. 671 P.2d 142 (Utah S. Ct, 1983); Walker v. Board of 
Pardons. 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah S. Ct., 1990); State v. Hamilton. 827 
P. 2d 232 (Utah S. Ct., 1992); 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review. 
Sections 663-667. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review, Section 664 succinctly 
enunciates the rule as follows: 
On review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a criminal conviction, the 
critical inquiry is whether the evidence can 
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The fact finder retains the 
function of weighing the evidence, and the 
appellate inquiry is not whether the appellate 
Court itself believes that the evidence at 
trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The verdict must be sustained if there 
7 
is substantial evidence to support it. In 
other words, the appellate Court must consider 
whether a rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid) 
In State v. Dyer, supra. the Utah Supreme Court states the 
rule as follows: 
Defendant's final contention is that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his 
conviction. To prevail on this contention, 
defendant must show that the evidence was so 
insubstantial or inconclusive that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime 
charged. (Ibid at 148-149) 
In State v. Hamilton, the Court stated: 
We review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. We 
reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence 
only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. (Ibid at 236) 
Applying the above cited cases and authority to the facts in 
the instant case, it is abundantly clear that the evidence herein 
presented was insufficient to demonstrate defendant's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
At trial herein, the City of West Valley elicited evidence 
from the arresting officer, one Travis Pearce, that he had been 
approached by a "bouncer" at the parking lot of a well-known West 
Valley drinking establishment and asked to detain a group of people 
getting into a Ford Bronco who reportedly had been involved in an 
altercation inside that establishment. Upon receiving such 
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information, Officer Pearce stopped the vehicle and detained the 
driver, Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker. Officer Pearce testified that 
he stopped the vehicle specifically at the request of the 
"bouncers," having himself observed no inappropriate conduct or 
violations of law. 
At this juncture, West Valley City Police Officer Corey 
Newbold arrived upon the scene to assist Officer Pearce. Officer 
Newbold testified that, upon detecting the odor of alcohol on 
Defendant-Appellant's person, he administered two "field tests" to 
Defendant-Appellant, the results of which, in his opinion and 
judgment, demonstrated that the Defendant-Appellant was impaired. 
Officer Newbold further testified that he administered a 
chemical test to Defendant-Appellant, specifically a Breathalyzer 
Test. The results of that test were excluded from evidence by the 
Trial Court. 
Defendant-Appellant Hunsaker testified that he had consumed 
only a small amount of alcohol on the evening in question, that he 
was in no wise impaired and that the "field tests" relied upon by 
the City herein were administered under the most adverse of 
conditions: 
"The difficulty was is I was wearing boots. 
It was not raining, it was snowing, very cold 
outside. I had a T-shirt on, I was shaking. 
I had over three, four different flashlights 
in my face." (Tr. 100) 
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Mr. Hunsaker's wife, April Hunsaker, testified that she picked 
up her husband at the West Valley City Police Department shortly 
after his arrest herein, that he appeared to be "normal" at such 
time and that he evidenced no unusual conduct or impairment when 
she saw him. 
From the above, it should be readily apparent that the only 
evidence against Defendant in the instant case consists in: 
1. Testimony by the arresting officer that he detected the 
odor of alcohol on Defendant's person. 
2. Testimony by the arresting officer as to the performance 
of Defendant on two "field tests" administered upon Defendant in 
extremely adverse circumstances. 
3. Opinion testimony by the arresting officer, in part based 
upon the performance of Defendant on the field tests, that in his 
judgment Defendant was impaired. 
Contra this evidence, Defendant presented testimony that the 
"field tests" were performed as well as might be expected under 
the extremely adverse circumstances, that the Defendant only 
consumed a small amount of alcohol and that both Defendant and his 
wife were of the opinion that Defendant was "normal" and manifested 
no outward indications of impairment. 
From the above, it should be readily apparent that the state 
of the evidence in this case is such that, even given the 
allowances and inferences the law reasonably allows, a reasonable 
person must and should conclude that the evidence herein is 
inherently inconclusive and improbable, and, indeed, that a 
10 
reasonable doubt exists. The case, as previously noted, is built 
on an insubstantial foundation. Certainly the odor of alcohol, by 
itself, would not be enough. Certainly the performance by 
Defendant on one field test (the second was a "Gaze Nystagmus" 
test) would not be enough under the extremely adverse circumstances 
of the test. Certainly the opinion of the officer, based in part 
on performance of that test and the odor of alcohol, would not be 
enough. Lumping all three together, can this Court reasonably 
conclude that the evidence herein satisfies the standard of the 
within cited cases? No. This Court should reverse the verdict and 
judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter with 
instructions to the Trial Court to enter a verdict and judgment of 
acquittal herein. 
POINT II 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER HEREIN DID NOT HAVE 
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP AND 
DETAIN THE DEFENDANT PRECEDENT TO ARREST. 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States 
provides, in pertinent part: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . . 
Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah provides, identically, in pertinent part: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effect, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . . 
Utah Code Annotated 77-7-2 provides: 
11 
A peace officer may make an arrest . . . 
without warrant: 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe 
the person has committed a public offense. 
In addition, Utah Code Annotated 77-7-15 provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in 
the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
It is well established as a matter of law that the stopping of 
a motor vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitutes a 
seizure within the meaning of Article I# Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (U.S. Supreme Ct., 
1968); State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App., 1994); State v. 
Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App., 1994). It is further well 
established that such stops are justified only if there is a 
reasonable suspicion that a person or persons is involved in 
criminal activity, and that reasonable suspicion must be based upon 
and supported by "specific and articulable facts." State v. Menke, 
787 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App., 1993); State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App., 
1992) ; State v. Case, Ibid. If such specific and articulable facts 
are not based upon an arresting officer's own observations and 
inferences, it has been held by this and other Courts that the 
legality of the stop will depend upon the sufficiency of the 
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articulable facts known to the individual originating the 
information received and acted upon by the investigating officer. 
State v. Case, Ibid; United States v. Henslev, 469 U.S. 221 (U.S. 
Supreme Ct., 1985). 
In State v. Case, supra, a case which appears to be "on all 
fours11, as it were, with the instant case, this Court said: 
. If the investigating officer cannot 
provide independent or corroborating 
information through his or her own 
observations, the legality of a stop based on 
information imparted by another will depend on 
the sufficiency of the articulable facts known 
to the individual originating the information 
. . . subsequently received and acted upon by 
the investigating officer. (Ibid at 1277) 
Applying the above cited cases and authority to the facts in 
the instant case, it is clear that the arresting officer herein did 
not himself have legal authority and probable cause to stop and 
detain the Defendant precedent to his arrest and that the City of 
West Valley failed to demonstrate, from the evidence, that the 
"originating party," so to speak, had the required "articulable 
facts" to justify the stop herein. 
At trial herein, the City of West Valley elicited testimony 
from the arresting officer, one Travis Pearce, that he had been 
approached by a "bouncer" at the parking lot of a well-known West 
Valley drinking establishment and asked to detain a group of people 
getting into a Ford Bronco who reportedly had been involved in an 
altercation inside that establishment. The source of the bouncer's 
information appears to have been a radio communication from an 
unknown party inside the tavern, although this was never clearly 
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established upon the record. At any rate, the bouncer himself was 
apparently not the original source since the record shows that he 
had been outside in the parking lot for at least fifteen (15) 
minutes. (Tr. 17-22) The bouncer was never called as a witness 
herein nor was the original source of his information ever 
identified nor, importantly, did the arresting officer or any 
officer ever investigate the supposed and reported incident 
further. What is clear is that, upon receipt of the request from 
the bouncer, Officer Pearce stopped and detained Defendant 
Hunsaker. Officer Pearce specifically stated that the stop was 
made only upon request of the bouncer and that he himself observed 
no inappropriate conduct or violations of law. 
It is readily apparent from the above that the officer who 
stopped and detained Defendant's vehicle herein did not have the 
required articulable reasonable grounds, under the above cited 
cases and authority, to stop and detain Defendant. The officer had 
observed no crime, had observed no violations of the law, whether 
traffic or more substantial, and had observed no "driving pattern." 
He was simply acting in direct response to a request by an unknown 
third party, how many times removed God only knows, to detain the 
Hunsaker party. The "bouncer" himself was never identified, let 
alone produced, by the City. The reporting party who, presumably 
by radio, contacted the police officer who then stopped and 
detained Defendant, was never identified, let alone produced as a 
witness. Indeed, since no further investigation of the purported 
incident was had, it should not be surprising that no witnesses 
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were produced. 
Thus, in the instant case, the sufficiency of the articulable 
facts known to the individual originating the request that 
Defendant be stopped and detained must be and cannot be provided. 
It cannot be provided because neither the "bouncer" nor the person 
or persons however many times removed who "originated" the 
information acted upon were called as witnesses herein. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in ruling that the stop and 
detention of Defendant in this case was constitutionally 
permissible. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPOSED ITSELF 
INTO THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS BY PRECLUDING 
A NEGOTIATED DISPOSITION OF THIS MATTER. 
Prior to trial herein, and specifically on January 27, 1995, 
April 19, 1995 and June 7, 1995, the City of West Valley and 
counsel for Defendant repeatedly petitioned and moved the Trial 
Court herein to permit amendment of the charges against Defendant-
Appellant to allow summary disposition of this case by plea 
arrangement. Those efforts on the part of counsel were repeatedly 
and steadfastly rebuffed by the Trial Court, and the matter 
thereupon proceeded to trial. 
It should be readily apparent that the actions of the Trial 
Court in improperly interposing itself into the plea bargaining 
process herein, and in precluding, by judicial fiat, the repeated 
attempts by the prosecution to compromise this case by negotiation, 
were improper, ill advised and a clear abuse of judicial discretion 
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and authority warranting reversal and remand of this matter for the 
purpose of effectuating the mutually agreed upon plea arrangement. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part: 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea 
to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal 
of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has 
been reached, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure of the 
tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. 
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
Rule 11 appears to confer upon the Trial Court the discretion 
to "approve" proffered plea arrangements. How, why and to what 
extent that includes the corresponding power to "disapprove" of 
such proffered plea arrangements is the subject that we ask this 
Court to now address. How, why and under what circumstances is it 
a reasonable exercise of the Court's discretion to refuse such plea 
arrangements? Finally, did the Trial Court herein abuse its 
discretionary powers in refusing to accept the plea arrangement 
agreed upon herein? 
It appears to be well established as a matter of law that a 
trial judge is generally under no duty to accept a negotiated 
settlement of a case, nor is he bound by any agreement between the 
parties, and that the acceptance of a plea of guilty to a lesser 
16 
offense included in the offense charged is generally a matter 
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. 21 Am. Jur. 2d# 
Criminal Law, Sections 484, 488; State v. Williams, 341 So. 2d 370 
(Louis. S. Ct., 1976); State v. Adams, 342 So. 2d 818 (Florida S. 
Ct., 1977); People v. West. 477 P.2d 409 (Cal. S. Ct., 1970); Frady 
v. People, 40 P.2d 606 (Colo. S. Ct., 1934). 
21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law. Sections 484, 486, state 
succinctly the black letter law herein: 
The trial judge is under no duty, 
statutory or otherwise, to accept a negotiated 
plea of guilty, nor is he bound by the 
agreement between the prosecution and the 
defendant. On the other hand, the trial judge 
may, after inquiring into the circumstances of 
the plea to determine whether it was voluntary 
and knowing, accept the plea as entered, 
unless the result of the plea would be 
contrary to statute, or circumvent the 
sentencing discretion of the trial judge. 
It has been said that the acceptance of a 
plea of guilty to a lesser offense included in 
the offense charged rests in the discretion of 
the court. (Ibid at 484, 488) 
Thus it is well established that the question of the 
acceptance or rejection of a proffered plea arrangement is one that 
is addressed to the sound discretion of the Trial Court. But what 
exactly does that mean? And, specifically, what does it mean in 
our governmental system of shared powers and "checks and balances"? 
And why, exactly# did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in the 
instant case? 
In this case, the Trial Court's rejection of the plea 
arrangement was an abuse of discretion because it was steadfastly 
17 
unreasonable and because it deprived the prosecution of the ability 
to compromise a weak case to effectuate the ends of justice. 
Further# it undercut the discretionary powers which the prosecutor, 
as a member of the Executive branch of government, possesses, and 
should be permitted to exercise without judicial interference where 
it is reasonable to do so. But, more importantly, the Trial 
Court's refusal of the plea bargain herein was an abuse of 
discretion because once all of the uncontroverted and uncontested 
good and substantial reasons for the plea bargain were communicated 
to the Court, the Court still steadfastly and unreasonably refused, 
without any legitimate basis, to permit the bargain. 
It should be noted that the repeated efforts on the part of 
the prosecution to compromise this case did not proceed merely from 
an abundance of charity and fellow feeling. This was and is a weak 
case. There was and is a problem here with respect to probable 
cause for the stop. There was, as demonstrated clearly by a later 
ruling of the Court, an anticipatable problem here with respect to 
the receipt in evidence of the chemical test. There were problems 
with the untoward circumstances of the giving of the "field tests". 
There was an anticipatable problem with respect to conflicts among 
witnesses as to whether or not Defendant showed demonstrable signs 
of impairment. In short, this was and is the very sort of case 
that normally is compromised by plea agreement. Only, in this 
case, the Court, by judicial fiat, precluded such compromise. 
Now this is not to suggest that the judiciary does not have 
some supervisory duties to perform in the area of accepting or 
18 
rejecting proffered plea arrangements. But the Trial Court should 
not be permitted to act as a "super-prosecutor" in the premises, 
usurping the legitimate decision making powers of the Executive 
branch of government at will. And, whenever that Executive branch 
of government seeks to exercise its discretionary powers vis a vis 
a plea arrangement, the Courts, as part of our system of reasonable 
checks and balances, ought only to be able to "check" that exercise 
of discretionary prosecutorial power, in situations where the 
Executive is unable to articulate on the record reasonable grounds 
for its actions. This, we opine, is and ought to be what is 
contemplated by Rule 11 of our Rules of Criminal Procedure. This 
is and ought to be the parameters of "sound Judicial discretion" in 
a Rule 11 plea bargaining situation. We urge, indeed importune the 
Court to so rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in concluding that the evidence 
presented herein was sufficient to demonstrate the guilt of 
Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the Trial Court 
erred in concluding that the arresting officer herein had legal 
authority to stop, detain and arrest Defendant. Finally, the Trial 
Court erred in improperly insinuating and interposing itself into 
the plea-bargaining process herein. 
This Court should reverse the judgment of conviction and 
sentence herein entered by the Trial Court and remand this matter 
with directions that the Trial Court order a verdict of acquittal 
herein. 
19 
DATED this 3ft " day of October, 1995. 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
V . ^ ^ * ^ i 
HUNSAKER, JAMIE DANIEL : 
1256 WAXWING i 
WVC, UTAH 84123 i 
11/25/72 : 
Defendant. : 
: I N F O R M A T I O N 
i Case No. 945015055 
The undersigned, VALERIE J- O'BRIEN, under oath, stateg^eri" 
information and belief that the defend^Hrfe, on or about 4 DECEMBER, 
1994, at the vicinity of 3370 SOWmilQQ WEST, West^Valley City, 
Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
CODNT 1: DUI, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, 41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, by driving or being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content of .08% or greater by weight or while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
OFFICER NEWBOLD 
OFFICER T. PEARCE 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information on the following: 
OFFICER STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT OPERATED A MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER 
^ > 
?c 
THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, DRUGS, OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH RENDERING 
HIM INCAPABLE OF SAFELY OPERATING^%TOR VEHIC"" 
ComplaMadt 
94-64107, MG/CP, HUNSAKER.JD1 
PTC: 27 JANUARY, 1995, 9:00 A.M. 
March 14, 1995 
2 
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ORDER OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE 
FILED 
W£*T VALLEY DEPT. 
O U l 2 * *<"• * 
Cteik of ibe.Clrcuii Couil 
By UlJ Deputy 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
HUNSAKER, JAMIE DANIEL 
1256 WAXWING 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84123 
CASE NO 
DOB 
TAPE 
DATE 
CITATION 
: 945015055 
: 11/25/72 
: COUNT 
: 07/26/95 
/ 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 
Plea: Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 13 87.50 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 90 DA Susp: 80 DA ACS: 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: FINE -PROSECUTOR SPL 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 750.00 
Fine Description: SURCHARGE - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 637.50 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 1,387.50 
TRACKING: 
Fine Stay 04/26/96 
Probation (Other) 07/26/96 
CALENDAR: 
SENTENCING 07/26/95 10:30 AM in rm 1 with EDWARD A. WATSON 
OTftTE OF UTAH 1 
COUNTY OF im&lMfg*?''***' 
I. the undMfottV&irfc # # 3 t o M CM* Cm*. 
<J? tn odgjhof 4tann0nf " 
tMbMd§ntftiantf,«Mj 
HUNSAKER, JAMIE DANIEL CASE NO: 945015055 PAGE 2 
Judge 
Chrg: 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Sentence: 
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor not present 
ATD: JONES, TOM 
Tape: 13206 Count: 124 
: EDWARD A. WATSON 
DUI Plea: Find: Guilty - Be 
Fine Amount: 1387.50 Suspended: .00 
Jail: 90 DAYS Suspended: 80 DAYS 
Fines and assessments entered: FN 750.00 
SB 637.50 
Total fines and assessments..: 1387.50 
DEF WAS PLACED ON PROBATION WITH ACEC FOR 12 MONTHS WITH THE 
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: SERVE 5 DAYS IN JAIL. REPORT ON 
7-28-95 AT 6 P.M. PERFORM 120 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE IN 
LIEU OF AN ADDITIONAL 5 DAYS JAIL. DO NOT CONSUME OR POSSESS 
ALCOHOL. COMPLETE LEVELS 1 AND 2 DUI CLASSES AT ACEC. COMPLETE 
ANY OTHER TREATMENT DEEMED NECESSARY. VIOLATE NO LAWS. 
PAY FINE WITHIN 9 MONTHS. ON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF 
PROBATION, THE BALANCE OF THE JAIL WILL BE SUSPENDED. 
JUDGES GIRCUIT COURT 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS V 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
STATE Of UTAH 
CCUMTY OF SALT 
I, tto undondgi 
o» UMv Salt Lata 
ccftRy that (ho 
or w\ ongvui 
Wtnecty 
'TV Of 
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Amend. I UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 438 
(ienrgiu 
CHARLES COTESWORTH 
PlNCKNEY, 
CHARLES PINCKNEY, 
PIERCE BUTLER. 
WILLIAM FEW, 
ABR BALDWIN. 
In Convention Monday September 17th 1787. 
Present The States of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. 
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved, 
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is 
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should after-
wards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, 
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the 
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent 
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting 
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof 
to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, 
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall 
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in 
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Elec-
tors should be appointed by the States which shall 
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Elec-
tors should assemble to vote for the President, and 
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings un-
der this Constitution. That after such Publication the 
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and 
Representatives elected: That the Electors should 
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the Presi-
dent, and should transmit their Votes certified, 
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution re-
quires, to the Secretary of the United States in Con-
gress assembled, that the Senators and Representa-
tives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; 
that the Senators should appoint a President of the 
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and 
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he 
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the Pres-
ident, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
Constitution. 
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention. 
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENT II 
(Right to bear arms.] 
A wrll regulated Militia, bein^ norrs nrv to the so. 
etirity of ;i free State, the right oi thr people hi keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed 
AMENDMENT 111 
(Quartering soldiers.l 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
(Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
(Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.) 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall pnvatc property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
(Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENTS IOC (BILL OF RIGHTSJ 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI1 
AMENDMENT I 
(Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT VII 
(Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
[Bail 
AMENDMENT VIII 
Punishment] 
Art, I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 550 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital 
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases 
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of 
the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecut ion by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but up^ 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized.
 189f 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — LibeL] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. lag* 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. ISW 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. isw 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec . 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec . 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec . 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec . 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 189 6 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. i896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operat ion of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights reta ined by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people. *89fl 
Sec. 26. [Provis ions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 1896 
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential 
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 1896 
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41-6-41 MOTOR VEHICLES 716 
41 -6-41. Statist ical information regarding accidents — 
Annual publ icat ion. 
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all accident 
reports and shall publish annually, or at more frequent 
intervals, related statistical information as to the number and 
circumstances of traffic accidents. 1987 
41-6*42. Local powers to require report. 
A local authority may by ordinance require that the operator 
of a vehicle involved in any accident, or the owner of the 
vehicle, also file with the designated municipal department a 
written report of the accident or a copy of any report required 
under this article to be filed with the department on accidents 
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the confi-
dential use of the municipal department and are subject to 
Section 41-6-40. 1887 
ARTICLES 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-43. Local DUI and related ordinances and reck-
less driv ing ordinances — Cons i s tent wi th 
code. 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs 
a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having alcohol in the blood or while under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of 
those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or 
evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any 
combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the 
provisions in this code which govern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs 
reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be 
consistent with the provisions of this code which govern those 
matters. 1987 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 1985 
41-6-44. Driv ing under the influence of alcohol, drugs, 
or wi th specified or unsafe blood alcohol con-
centrat ion — Measurement of blood or breath 
alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest 
wi thout warrant — Penal t ies — Suspens ion 
or revocat ion of l i cense — Penalt ies . 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test 
given within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this 
section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol 
concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a 
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon an-
other as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner, or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in 
the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of 
simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of 
care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person 
exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes 
any similar local ordinance adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, 
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence 
of not less than 48 consecutive hours' nor more than 240 
hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the 
person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours. 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
the court may order the person to obtain treatment at 
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility 
if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilita-
tion facility determines that the person has a problem 
condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation under this section the 
court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor 
more than 720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the 
person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at a 
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facil-
ity, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order 
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of two prior violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in 
Subsections (ii) and (7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convic-
tions are for violations committed after April 23, 
1990. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of 
any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not 
less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court shall as part of 
any sentence impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 
hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
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program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not 
serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion 
of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro-
gram approved by the court may be a sentencing 
alternative to incarceration or community service if 
the program provides intensive care or inpatient 
treatment and long-term closely supervised follow 
through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of the prior violations under 
this section is a third degree felony if at least three prior 
convictions are for violations committed after April 23, 
1990. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine 
of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 
hours. 
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not 
serve the jail sentence. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by 
the court may be a sentencing alternative to incar-
ceration or community service if the program pro-
vides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-
term closely supervised follow through after the 
treatment. 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the person to 
obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency reha-
bilitation facility. 
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required 
under this section may not be suspended and the con-
victed person is not eligible for parole or probation until 
any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a 
violation under this section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license sus-
pended or revoked as a result of the conviction under this 
section, until the convicted person has furnished evidence 
satisfactory to the department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assess-
ment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation or-
dered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution 
and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person 
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or 
subsequent conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive 
or illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the convic-
tion is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior 
violations committed after July 1, 1993. 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7) 
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted 
person to: participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment 
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facil-
ity; or do any combination of those things, apply to a 
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that 
qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection (10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regard-
ing education or treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in connec-
tion with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior convic-
tion under Subsection (10), as the court would render 
in connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of 
Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of detennining whether a conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction 
under Subsection (10), is a first, second, or subsequent 
conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction 
under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered 
a prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro-
gram* and any community-based or other education pro-
gram provided for in this section shall be approved by the 
Department of Human Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty 
or no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under Section 
41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis 
for the plea, including whether or not there had been 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the viola-
tion. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts 
that shows whether there was consumption of alco-
hol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, 
in connection with the violation. 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the 
consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 as 
follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of 
guilty or no contest to a charge of violating Section 
41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the record that 
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation, the resulting conviction is a prior con-
viction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and 
(7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each con-
viction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the 
purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7). 
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person 
for a violation of this section when the officer has probable 
cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that 
the violation was committed by the person. 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a 
person convicted for the first time under Subsection 
(1); and 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person 
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection 
(1) if the violation is committed within a period of six 
years from the date of the prior violation. 
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(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension 
or revocation period the number of days for which a 
license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223, 
if the previous suspension was based on the same occur-
rence upon which the record of conviction is based. 1994 
41-6-44.1. Procedures —Adjudicat ive proceedings. 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the 
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its 
adjudicative proceedings. 1987 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. 1983 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — 
Evidence . 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety 
shall establish standards for the administration and interpre-
tation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including 
standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made 
and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards 
established in Subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular 
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate 
their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under 
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been 
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and 
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnec-
essary. 1987 
41-6-44.4. Person under 21 may not operate vehic le 
with detectable alcohol in body — Chemical 
test procedures — Temporary l icense — Hear-
ing and decis ion — Suspens ion of l icense or 
operat ing privi lege — Fees — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) As used in this section "local substance abuse au-
thority" has the same meaning as provided in Section 
62A-8-101. 
(b) Calculations of blood, breath, or urine alcohol con-
centration under this section shall be made in accordance 
with the procedures in Subsection 41-6-44(2). 
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age may not 
operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle with 
any measurable blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentra-
tion in his body as shown by a chemical test. 
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license who 
violates Subsection (a), in addition to any other 
applicable penalties arising out of the incident, shall 
have his operator license denied or suspended as 
provided in Subsection (ii). 
(ii) (A) For a first offense under Subsection (a), the 
Driver License Division of the Department of 
Public Safety shall deny the person's operator 
license if ordered or not challenged under this 
section for a period of 90 days beginning on the 
30th day after the date of the arrest under 
Section 32A-12-209. 
(B) For a second or subsequent offense under 
Subsection (a), within three years of a prior 
denial or suspension, the Driver License Division 
shall suspend the person's operator license for a 
period of one year beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest, 
(c) (i) A person who has not been issued an operator 
license who violates Subsection (a), in addition to any 
other penalties arising out of the incident, shall be 
punished as provided in Subsection (ii). 
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, whichever U 
longer, a person may not operate a vehicle and the 
Driver License Division may not issue the person an 
operator license or learner's permit. 
(3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that a person may be violating or has violated 
Subsection (2), the peace officer may, in connection with 
arresting the person for a violajtion of Section 32A-12-209, 
request that the person submit to a chemical test or tests 
to be administered in compliance with the standards 
under Section 41-6-44.10. 
(b) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the 
person's submission to a chemical test that a test result 
indicating a violation of Subsection (2)(a) will result in 
denial or suspension of the person's license to operate a 
motor vehicle or a refusal to issue a license. 
(c) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test 
results indicate a blood, breath, or urine alcohol content 
in violation of Subsection (2Xa), or if the officer makes a 
determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the 
person is otherwise in violation of Subsection (2)(a), the 
officer directing administration of the test or making the 
determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the 
Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver 
License Division's intention to deny or suspend the per-
son's license to operate a vehicle or refusal to issue a 
license under Subsection (2). 
(4) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of 
the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(a) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of 
the operator, 
(b) issue a temporary license certificate effective for 
only 29 days if the driver had a valid operator's license; 
and 
(c) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by 
the Driver License Division, basic information regarding 
how to obtain a prompt hearing before the Driver License 
Division. 
(5) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to 
form by the Driver License Division, serve also as the tempo-
rary license certificate under Subsection (4Kb). 
(6) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the 
Driver License Division within five days after the date of 
arrest and service of the notice: 
(a) the person's driver license certificate, if any, 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the Driver 
License Division indicating the chemical test results, if 
any; and 
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that 
the person has violated Subsection (2). 
(7) (a) (i) Upon written request, the Driver License Divi-
sion shall grant to the person an opportunity to be 
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest under 
Section 32A-12-209. 
(ii) The request shall be made within ten days of 
the date of the arrest. 
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the Driver License 
Division in the county in which the arrest occurred, 
unless the Driver License Division and the person agree 
that the hearing may be held in 6ome other county. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover 
the issues of: 
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Section 
77-7-16. 
77-7-17. 
77-7-18. 
77-7-19. 
77-7-20. 
77-7-21. 
77-7-22. 
77-7-23. 
Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for 
dangerous weapon — Grounds. 
Authority of peace officer to take possession of 
weapons. 
Citation on misdemeanor or infraction charge. 
Appearance required by citation — Arrest for 
failure to appear — Transfer of cases — Motor 
vehicle violations — Disposition of fines and 
costs. 
Service of citation on defendant — Filing in court 
— Contents of citations. 
Proceeding on citation — Voluntary forfeiture of 
bail — Parent signature required — Informa-
tion, when required. 
Failure to appear as misdemeanor. 
Delivery of prisoner arrested without warrant to 
magistrate — Transfer to court with jurisdic-
tion — Violation as misdemeanor. 
77-7-1- "Arrest" defined — Restraint al lowed. 
An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or 
lubmission to custody. The person shall not be subjected to 
my more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and 
detention. i960 
77-7-2. B y peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in 
the presence of any peace officer, "presence" includes all of 
the physical senses or any device that enhances the 
acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or 
records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony 
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable 
cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property be-
longing to another person. 1986 
77-7-3. By private persons. 
A private person may arrest another 
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his 
presence; or 
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has 
reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has com-
mitted i t 1980 
77-7-4. Magistrate may orally order arrest. 
A magistrate may orally require a peace officer to arrest 
toyone committing or attempting to commit a public offense in 
the presence of the magistrate, and, in the case of an emer-
gency, when probable cause exists, a magistrate may orally 
authorize a peace officer to arrest a person for a public offense, 
«nd thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall be 
filed against the person arrested. 1980 
77-7-5. Issuance of warrant — Time and place arrests 
may be made — Contents of warrant — Re-
sponsibi l i ty for transporting prisoners — 
Court clerk to d ispense restitution for trans-
portation. 
(1) A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon 
finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested 
has committed a public offense. If the offense charged is: 
(a) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at 
any time of the day or night; or 
(b) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be 
made at night only if: 
(i) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do 
so on the warrant; 
(ii) the person to be arrested is upon a public 
highway, in a public place, or in a place open to or 
accessible to the public; or 
(iii) the person to be arrested is encountered by a 
peace officer in the regular course of that peace 
officer's investigation of a criminal offense unrelated 
to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest. 
(2) (a) If the magistrate determines that the accused must 
appear in court, the magistrate shall include in the arrest 
warrant the name of the law enforcement agency in the 
county or municipality with jurisdiction over the offense 
charged. 
(b) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the 
magistrate under Subsection (a) is responsible for 
providing inter-county transportation of the defen-
dant, if necessary, from the arresting law enforce-
ment agency to the court site. 
(ii) The law enforcement agency named on the 
warrant may contract with another law enforcement 
agency to have a defendant transported. 
(c) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the 
magistrate under Subsection (a) as responsible for 
transporting the defendant shall provide to the court 
clerk of the court in which the defendant is tried, an 
affidavit stating that the defendant was transported, 
indicating the law enforcement agency responsible 
for the transportation, and stating the number of 
miles the defendant was transported. 
(ii) The court clerk shall account for restitution 
paid under Section 76-3-201 for governmental trans-
portation expenses and dispense restitution monies 
collected by the court to the law enforcement agency 
responsible for the transportation of a convicted de-
fendant. 1993 
77-7-5.5. Repealed. 1991 
77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. 
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person 
being arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest 
him^ Such notice shall not be required when: 
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger 
the life or safety of the officer or another person or will 
likely enable the party being arrested to escape; 
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the 
commission of, or an attempt to commit, an offense; or 
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately 
after the commission of an offense or an escape. 
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in Subsec-
tion 78-24a-l(2), is arrested for an alleged violation of a 
criminal law, including a local ordinance, the arresting 
officer shall assess the communicative abilities of the 
hearing-impaired person and conduct this notification, 
and any further notifications of rights, warnings, interro-
gations, or taking of statements, in a manner that accu-
rately and effectively communicates with the hearing-
impaired person including qualified interpreters, lip 
reading, pen and paper, typewriters, computers with 
print-out capability, and telecommunications devices for 
the deaf. 
(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor to be 
considered by any court when evaluating whether state-
ments of a hearing-impaired person were made know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 1995 
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77-7-7. Force in making arrest. 
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after 
being informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person 
arresting may use reasonable force to effect the arrest. Deadly 
force may be used only as provided in Section 76-2-404. isso 
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, wben. 
lb make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, 
and in all cases, a peace officer, may break the door or window 
of the building in which the person to be arrested is, or in 
which there are reasonable grounds for believing him to be. 
Before making the break, the person shall demand admission 
and explain the purpose for which admission is desired. 
Demand and explanation need not be given before breaking 
under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or where there is 
reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed, isso 
77-7-9. Weapons m a y be taken from prisoner. 
Any person making an arrest may seize from the person 
arrested all weapons which he may have on or about his 
person. 1980 
77-7-10. Telegraph or te lephone authorizat ion of ex-
ecut ion of arrest warrant. 
Any magistrate may, by an endorsement on a warrant of 
arrest, authorize by telegraph, telephone or other reasonable 
means, its execution. A copy of the warrant or notice of its 
issuance and terms may be sent to one or more peace officers. 
The copy or notice communicated authorizes the officer to 
proceed in the same manner under it as if he had an original 
warrant. 1980 
77-7-11. Possess ion of warrant by arrest ing officer not 
required. 
Any peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding 
warrant of arrest may arrest a person he reasonably believes 
to be the person described in the warrant, without the peace 
officer having physical possession of the warrant. 1980 
77-7-12. Detaining persons suspected of shoplift ing or 
library theft — Persons authorized. 
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, ser-
vant, or agent who has reasonable grounds to believe that 
goods held or displayed for sale by the merchant have been 
taken by a person with intent to steal may, for the purpose of 
investigating the unlawful act and attempting to effect a 
recovery of the goods, detain the person in a reasonable 
manner for a reasonable length of time. 
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library may detain a 
person for the purposes and under the limits of Subsection (1) 
if there are reasonable grounds to believe the person violated 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Par t 8, Library Theft. 1987 
77-7-13. Arrest without warrant by peace officer — 
Reasonable grounds, what constitutes — Ex-
emption from civil or criminal liability. 
( D A peace officer may arrest, without warrant, any person 
he has reasonable ground to believe has committed a theft 
under Title 76, Chapter 6, Par t 8, Library Theft, or of goods 
held or displayed for sale. 
(2) A charge of theft made to a peace officer under Part 8, 
Library Theft, by an employee of a library, or by a merchant, 
merchant's employee, servant, or agent constitutes a reason-
able ground for arrest, and the police officer is relieved from 
any civil or criminal liability. 1987 
77-7-14. Person caus ing detention or arrest of person 
suspected of shoplift ing or library theft — 
Civil and criminal immunity. 
( D A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, ser-
vant, or agent who causes the detention of a person as 
provided in Section 77-7-12, or who causes the arrest of a 
person for theft^of goods held or displayed for sale, is not 
criminally or civilly liable where he has reasonable and 
probable cause to believe the person detained or arrested 
committed a theft of goods held or displayed for sale. 
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library who causes a 
detention or arrest of a person under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 
8, Library Theft, is not criminally or civilly liable where he has 
reasonable and probable cause to believe that the person 
committed a theft of library materials. 1987 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an explana-
tion of his actions. isso 
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for 
dangerous weapon — Grounds. 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he 
reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger. 1980 
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take possession 
of weapons. 
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pursuant to a 
frisk may take and keep it until the completion of the 
questioning, at which time he shall either return it if lawfully 
possessed, or arrest such person. 1980 
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction 
charge. 
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into custody, any 
public official of any county or municipality charged with the 
enforcement of the law, a port-of-entry agent as defined in 
Section 27-12-2, and a volunteer authorized to issue a citation 
under Section 41-la-414 may issue and deliver a citation 
requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a 
misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the 
magistrate before whom the person should be taken pursuant 
to law if the person had been arrested. 1994 
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation — Arrest for 
failure to appear — Transfer of cases — Motor 
vehicle violations — Disposition of fines and 
costs. 
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall appear 
before the magistrate designated in the citation on or before 
the time and date specified in the citation unless the uniform 
bail schedule adopted by the Judicial Council or Subsection 
77-7-21(1) permits forfeiture of bail for the offense charged. 
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear sooner 
than five days or later than 14 days following its issuance. 
(3) A person who receives a citation and who fails to comply 
with Section 77-7-21 on or before the time and date and at the 
court specified is subject to arrest. The magistrate may issue 
a warrant of arrest. 
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a citation or 
information issued for violations of Title 41 shall state that the 
person receiving the citation or information shall appear 
before the magistrate who has jurisdiction over the offense 
charged. 
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of either 
the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney, based on a lack 
of territorial jurisdiction or the disqualification of the judge, 
transfer cases to the nearest justice court or the nearest circuit 
court within the county. 
(6) (a) Clerks and other administrative personnel serving 
the district, circuit, juvenile, and justice courts shall 
ensure that all citations for violation of Title 41 are filed in 
643 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
found proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to 
death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys 
must meet the following requirements: 
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in 
at least three felony appeals; and 
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and 
completed within the past five years an approved contin-
uing legal education course which deals, in substantial 
part, with the trial or appeal of death penalty cases. 
(d) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow 
the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself be 
grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively 
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal. 
(e) Costs and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be 
paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title 77. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Rule 9. Repealed. 
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in 
single court. 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, cita-
tions, or informations charging multiple offenses, which 
may include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or 
municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal 
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense 
with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses 
charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or in-
formation may not be separated except by order of the 
court and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicat-
ing the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction 
over all the offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial entity 
shall prosecute the offenses. 
Rule 10. Arraignment. 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the 
records from the magistrate following a bind-over, the defen-
dant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court. Ar-
raignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist 
of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or 
stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on him 
to plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or 
information before he is called upon to plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional 
time in which to plead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time 
may be granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any 
proceeding provided for by statute or these rules prior to 
arraignment shall be specifically and expressly objected to 
before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is waived. 
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own 
recognizance, prior to arraignment and thereafter fails to 
appear for arraignment or trial when required to do so, a 
warrant of arrest may issue and bail may be forfeited. 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant 
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives 
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to 
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not 
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursu-
ant to Rule 21.5. A defendant may plead in the alternative not 
guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses 
to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court 
shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent 
of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case 
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make 
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases 
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for 
a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no 
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or 
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does 
not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presump-
tion of innocence, the right against compulsory self-
mcrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in 
open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel 
the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and ele-
ments of the offense to which the plea is entered, that 
upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory 
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for 
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea 
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement 
has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits 
for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any 
other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be ap-
proved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that 
any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court, 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions 
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecut-
ing attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, 
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for 
it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be ap-
proved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition 
should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the 
judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the 
defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
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(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of 
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the 
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to with-
draw the plea. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or 
hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. 
It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is 
made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported 
by affidavit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue may be 
raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be 
raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the 
indictment or information other than that it fails to show 
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which 
objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during 
the pendency of the proceeding; 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence; 
(3) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants 
under Rule 9; or 
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before 
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or 
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to 
trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver 
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from 
such waiver. 
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be 
made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including 
such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally. 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the 
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or informa-
tion, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable 
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or 
information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
Rule 13. Pretrial conference. 
(a) The trial court, in its discretion, may hold a pretrial 
conference, with trial counsel present, to consider such mat-
ters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. The accused 
shall be present unless he waives his right to appear. 
(b) At the conclusion of the conference, a pretrial order shall 
set out the matters ruled upon. Any stipulations made shall be 
signed by counsel, approved by the court and filed, and shall 
be binding upon the parties at trial, on appeal, and in 
postconviction proceedings unless set aside or modified by the 
court. 
Rule 14. Subpoena. 
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or 
interpreter before a court, magistrate or grand jury in connec-
tion with a criminal investigation or prosecution may be 
issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed, 
the county attorney on his own initiative or upon the direction 
of the grand jury, or the court in which an information or 
indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court in which a case 
is pending shall issue in blank to the defendant, without 
charge, as many signed subpoenas as the defendant may 
require. 
(b) A subpoena may command the person to whom it is 
directed to appear and testify or to produce in court or to allow 
inspection of records, papers or other objects. The court may 
quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unrea-
sonable. 
(c) A subpoena may be served by any person over the age of 
18 years who is not a party. Service shall be made by 
delivering a copy of the subpoena to the witness or interpreter 
personally and notifying him of the contents. A peace officer 
shall serve any subpoena delivered to him for service in his 
county. 
(d) Written return of service of a subpoena shall be made 
promptly to the court and to the person requesting that the 
subpoena be served, stating the time and place of service and 
by whom service was made. 
(e) A subpoena may compel the attendance of a witness 
from anywhere in the state. 
(f) When a person required as a witness is in custody within 
the state, the court may order the officer having custody of the 
witness to bring him before the court. 
(g) Failure to obey a subpoena without reasonable excuse 
may be deemed a contempt of the court responsible for its 
issuance. 
(h) Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state, 
or is so ill or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for 
believing that he will be unable to attend a trial or hearing, 
either party may, upon notice to the other, apply to the court 
for an order that the witness be examined conditionally by 
deposition. Attendance of the witness at the deposition may be 
compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall be present at the 
deposition and the court shall make whatever order is neces-
sary to effect such attendance. 
Rule 15. Expert witnesses and interpreters. 
(a) The court may appoint any expert witness agreed upon 
by the parties or of its own selection. An expert so appointed 
shall be informed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy 
of which shall be filed. An expert so appointed shall advise the 
court and the parties of his findings and may thereafter be 
called to testify by the court or by any party. He shall be 
subject to cross-examination by each party. The court shall 
determine the reasonable compensation of the expert and 
direct payment thereof. The parties may call expert witnesses 
of their own at their own expense. Upon showing that a 
defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert 
whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the wit-
ness fee shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of the 
prosecution. 
(b) The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selec-
tion and shall determine reasonable compensation and direct 
payment thereof. The court may allow counsel to question the 
interpreter before he is sworn to discharge the duties of an 
interpreter. 
Rule 15.5. Visual recording of statement or testimony 
of child victim or witness of sexual or physi-
cal abuse — Conditions of admissibility. 
(1) In any case concerning a charge of child abuse or of a 
sexual offense against a child, the oral statement of a victim or 
witness younger than 14 years of age may be recorded prior to 
the filing of an information or indictment, and upon motion 
and for good cause shown is admissible as evidence in any 
court proceeding regarding the offense if all of the following 
conditions are met: 
(a) no attorney for either party is in the child's presence 
when the statement is recorded; 
